“European diplomats and European military leaders in times of war”

Breakfast debate on 20 September 2022

By Claude-France Arnould and General Jean-Paul Thonier

Background to this breakfast debate (online debate i.e. more a seminar than a conventional breakfast meeting): A career diplomat and an army General discuss their respective roles in times of war. This topic, which has also been proposed to 2nd year Masters students at the Institute of Political Studies in Strasbourg at which General Thonier lectures, is of particular interest to EuroDéfense-France in view of the war in Eastern Europe.

Speakers:

- Claude-France Arnould, minister plenipotentiary and, currently, special adviser to the President for European Affairs at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI). During her long defence sector career, Ms Arnould was Director of the SGDN (International and Strategic Affairs at the General Secretariat for National Defence) from 1998 to 2001 before joining the Council of the European Union as Director for Defence Matters, then Head of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate. She was Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency from 2011 to 2015 and French Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium from 2015 to 2019.

- General Jean-Paul Thonier currently lectures on “European Security and International Stability” to 2nd year Masters’ degree students at the Institute of Political Studies in Strasbourg. General Thonier is a now retired career solider with a wealth of experience in the field, as part of either purely French or UN or European Union contingents. He commanded the 2nd Marine Infantry Regiment from 1994 to 1996 and the 9th Marine Infantry Brigade from 2003 to 2005.

Proceedings: The speakers had agreed to analyse the relations between diplomats and members of the armed forces on the basis of three of General Thonier’s personal experiences. The first two were selected to illustrate the assumption whereby diplomats are in charge during negotiations, whereas in emergencies military issues can override the diplomatic interest. By contrast, the third example was designed to show that diplomats and members of the armed forces can work together and be mutually supportive in times of crisis.

Before addressing these issues, Ms Arnould talked about her experience at the General Secretariat for National Defence and within European Union structures, the latter being a small-scale replica of NATO’s defence arrangements, despite differences in the nature of the authority and political configuration of NATO and the EU. In addition, it had been decided to keep military and civilian (including diplomats) functions separate in the EU, which was patently obvious at committee level with the Political and Security Committee, composed of diplomats (one per Member State) at the top of the hierarchical tree and the Military Committee consigned to an advisory role, even if its advice was usually taken. This situation stemmed from having from replicated NATO structures and from the tendency to view defence as part of foreign affairs. For Ms Arnould, military issues were separate from diplomacy and a way should be found to put military and civilian aspects on an equal footing in terms of legitimacy and responsibility, both ultimately being subordinate to political decisions (those of the European Council).

I. First example: during negotiations, the armed forces let diplomats take the lead

Context: Mid-September 2001. Colonel Thonier had just taken up his position at the head of the Africa Bureau of the International Relations Sub-Directorate of the French Defence Staff. At the time, the issue that had to be addressed concerned French military support for the United States in the wake of 9/11.

General Thonier: The Chief of the Defence Staff had been remitted with the task of formulating proposals. Two options emerged from the groundwork conducted by his staff. The first consisted of joining forces with the Americans in Afghanistan as part of an ad hoc coalition, the second of spearheading anti-terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa and Yemen from Djibouti. The second option had been examined with diplomats from the Africa and Indian Ocean Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This option was favourably received by American military leaders, who were of the opinion that French capacity deployment in Afghanistan would not be decisive, whereas France’s existing military installations in Djibouti, its knowledge and skills in that part of the world could be a major plus in countering terrorism.

This proposal, which was considered founded, was put to President Chirac at the French Defence Council in early October together with the option of military involvement in Afghanistan. The President decided in favour of joining forces with the Americans in Afghanistan, the more cautious and less politically risky option.

Claude-France Arnould: Her only addition to General Thonier’s recollections was that, in the particular instance under consideration, it was a case of politicians versus the military.

When Ms Arnould attended NATO meetings, she was often irritated by the way the military would employ the word “politicians” to refer to both politicians and diplomats, since diplomacy and politics were two very different professions, the diplomat’s job being on a par with that of the military. In the case mentioned by General Thonier, the decision was political. It was quite possible that the position of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was closer to that of the President for reasons pertaining to the Alliance, France’s position within NATO, and exchanges between the Ministry and the State Department (and not with the Pentagon). It was perfectly possible that the State Department may have favoured the politically higher profile solution of a coalition created for Afghan operations.

In short, diplomats and soldiers were doing two completely different jobs, both answerable to the politicians. The tendency of members of the armed forces to mistrust politicians (and diplomats) could be ascribed to traumatic experiences of the past. This was patently the case in Germany where, for the armed forces, evil (i.e. Nazism) originated in politics, the army itself being “devoid of all impure thoughts or intentions”. For French military personnel, the traumatic event was decolonisation. Their experiences in Yugoslavia were another example. Diplomats acted somewhat arrogantly, turning a deaf ear to the military’s demands regarding their mission and, in particular, the rules of engagement. Behind the scenes, members of the armed forces were mocked for being fainthearted. At the time, this heavily affected relations between diplomats and army officers.

History went on to prove that military leaders had been right. The vagueness over the rules of engagement may have been clarified, but all this left behind a measure of distrust and an unapologetic and in some ways legitimate "them against us" attitude among the military.

In democracies, the armed forces and diplomats were subordinate to politicians, but both had legitimate authority to give advice and even voice disagreement. When preparing military operations, the armed forces should give the political decision makers all the information available, without holding back, as they too often wont to do. There should be no hesitation in making the sort of frank suggestions proposed by the Defence Staff according to General Thonier and, if such suggestions were ignored, then the politicians would be held responsible.

II. Second example: in emergencies and in the face of potential loss of life, military must take precedence over diplomatic action

Context: In November 2004, (the then) Brigadier General Thonier was commanding the 9th Marine Infantry Brigade, which had been tasked with taking charge of action on the ground as part of Operation Licorne, a peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire. He himself had the role of second-in-command to the General in charge of Operations responsible for leading this action. On 6 November, the Ivorian armed forces attacked the French arm of Operation Licorne, killing nine people and wounding several dozen.

General Thonier: Since summer 2002, Côte d'Ivoire had been split in two, with the south controlled by the Ivorian government and the north in the hands of the rebel forces. The French forces involved in Operation Licorne were deployed to act as go-betweens between the two warring camps, tasked by the UN with enforcing the ceasefire. A base was set up in the grounds of the Lycée Descartes in Bouaké.

On 4 November, President Gbagbo launched Operation Dignity to restore the State’s authority in the northern part of the country. By the morning of 6 November, the loyalist ground offensive had reached the outskirts of Bouaké. At around 1 p.m., General Thonier received the first reports of rocket fire at the Lycée Descartes and the dreadful news that his troops had just been attacked by the national army of a “friendly” country.

There was shock and pain as the list of dead and wounded grew longer, but there was also an urgent need to act. For General Thonier, that meant military action.

It was clear to him that three types of military action were required:

- Destroying or neutralising Ivorian air force strike capabilities

- Securing Port Bouet and the airport, regaining control over the runway, by engaging in fierce combat, to enable reinforcements to be flown in from Libreville.

- Upping troop numbers in Abidjan, which was essential to maintaining control over Port Bouet and the airport and securing the assembly points where French and foreign nationals (10,000 in Abidjan at the time) were to gather for evacuation.

Over three long action-packed days, General Thonier was less concerned with why his troops had been attacked than with how to deal with the outcome. His sole obsession was that of ensuring that his troops emerged victorious from this show of strength perpetrated by the Ivorian government and street mobs.

For his part, the French ambassador called for a truce or a window of opportunity to resume dialogue with the Ivorian President, but his pleas fell on deaf ears.

This was a good example of how military action may at times be in contradiction with diplomatic interests.

Claude-France Arnould: This tragic situation begged the vital question of who should decide in the event of absolute emergencies in the field. It such cases, it clearly lay with the armed forces on the ground. They had to assume responsibility for their decisions, account for and be held accountable for their actions.

The situation was complicated enough in a national chain of command, but even more so in a multinational context (involving NATO or, more importantly, the EU).

The EU having no equivalent of NATO’s SACEUR, this raised the question of who headed operations. Ms Arnould gave two examples of the ambiguity of responsibilities within the EU. Both concerned Javier Solana, at the time EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The first example, which was symbolic in nature, concerned to the funeral of a soldier killed during the EU operation in Chad. Ms Arnould had suggested to Mr Solana's office that he should pay his respects to the deceased soldier and his family. For Mr Solana, as a former NATO Secretary General, this was out of the question, since the responsibility was national.

A further example concerned the second operation in the Congo and who should decide if the UN asked the EU to intervene. For Ms Arnould, it was obvious that it should be Mr Solana. For Mr Solana, it was obvious that it could not be him since, in the NATO system, responsibility for military operations lay not with the Secretary General, but with SACEUR. As Mr Solana saw it, responsibility could only lie with a member of the armed forces, in this case the Chairman of the Military Committee (General Bentégeat, at the time). However, as this committee only had an advisory role, it was inconceivable that it could make decisions in situations such as those described by General Thonier.

In response to the question of who was in charge in the event of EU operations, the commander of the troops on the ground had to be given full responsibility, but needed to act in tandem with a contact in Brussels to discuss and defend the position adopted.

To return to the situation described by General Thonier, only the field commander had all the information needed to make immediate decisions, even if, technically, the need for immediacy did not preclude decisions from afar.

Ms Arnould also drew a parallel with the United Nations in connection with an operation in Lebanon following Israeli strikes. It was envisaged that either the UN or the EU would intervene. Most of those concerned favoured EU action because of its available military chain of command, whereas in the UN responsibilities lay more with civilians. When it was ultimately decided that intervention in Lebanon should be via the UN, this was done on condition that military chiefs would have more responsibility in the chain of command.

III. Third example: a security crisis where diplomats and military act together, providing mutual support

Context: As soon as Joseph Kabila came to power following the assassination of his father in 2001, he tried to re-establish contact with the various rebel groups in the east of the country (in Ituri, where UN forces were already present). A consensus was reached in September 2002 to put an end to internal confrontations. The so-called Luanda Agreement made provision for the withdrawal of the Ugandan army. The departure of these forces in late April 2003 left a security vacuum and triggered new inter-ethnic clashes. The Uruguayan battalion of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) that was then deployed proved incapable of containing militia violence.

General Thonier: Operation ARTEMIS began on 6 June 2003 as a French operation codenamed MAMBA. Ten days later, on 16 June, it was renamed ARTEMIS when it became a European operation. This ended on 1 September 2003 when the EU handed over responsibility for stabilisation operations to the UN, which had in the meantime deployed over 5,000 troops.

General Thonier was field commander of the troops responsible for controlling Bunia airport, securing the town and protecting the population to give the UN forces time to reorganise and regain control of the situation by boosting military capabilities and enforcing more robust rules of engagement (MONUC 23).

For those interested in the EU and its security and defence policy, ARTEMIS will always be the first “executive mission” led by the EU, the first autonomous EU operation, the first rapid response EU mission, the first operation outside Europe, the first operation applying the “Framework Nations Concept” and the first example of a "relay operation", conducted in cooperation between the EU and the United Nations. For General Thonier, it was both a military and, especially, a diplomatic success.

Before, during and after of the operation, diplomats from the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, other participating nations and the EU all played their parts efficiently and with remarkable pragmatism.

Before: The adoption of the Framework Nations Concept, with France in the role of framework nation in this particular case, was the decisive factor in convincing the most hesitant nations to participate in field operations. Fourteen out of the then fifteen EU Members took part in this operation, at least at military staff level. Three non-European nations were also involved: Canada, Brazil and South Africa. Bringing these three nations on board was a diplomatic triumph in itself.

During: General Thonier enjoyed the support of the European ambassadors in the sub-region in justifying the legitimacy of the operation.

After: Under diplomatic pressure from the EU, the UN achieved the major feat of deploying a force of more than 5,000 soldiers in under two months, even though most came from Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Claude-France Arnould: ARTEMIS was the first autonomous EU operation launched without recourse to NATO resources. It was the upshot of numerous exchanges between military personnel and civilians. At first, Kofi Annan, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, had called French President Jacques Chirac and Javier Solana. While President Chirac was in agreement, there remained the possibility that the operation could become European. Would France favour this option? Ms Arnould and other members of her team were received by the French MoD’s Operations Planning and Conduct Centre (Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations, CPCO) and then by the Chief of the Defence Staff, who endorsed an EU operation with France serving as framework nation, on condition that the rules of engagement set out in the French plan remained²² unchanged.

The normal procedures for organising EU operations were thrown out of kilter with two thirds falling by the wayside. Ms Arnould, who was named Operation Coordinator in Brussels, headed a small-scale task force. To plan EU action, she largely drew inspiration from the French approach. Despite the complexity of the procedures, it took only 11 days to get the operation up and running.

France had been considering calling on US air transport capacities. However, with the operation now having a “Berlin Plus” dimension (i.e. with NATO resources, a “procedural nightmare” according to Ms Arnould) and things were growing increasingly complex, bringing in US capacities would have taken too long. The American support option was therefore abandoned and replaced by cooperation with third countries, especially Canada. This decision had no detrimental effect on diplomatic relations with the United States.

Ms Arnould confirmed that South African involvement was politically very important. She emphasised how smooth cooperation with the United Nations had been, with the EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region providing logistical and political support for the operation.

Plans were also made to follow up the military campaign with civilian action in coordination with the IMF and the World Bank.

Ms Arnould also flagged up the enthusiasm with which the EU institutions unanimously reacted to the operation, not least given its positive outcome (this being its greatest success).

In a nutshell, ARTEMIS was an exemplary operation, with excellent military and civilian teamwork. It was a success because France was prepared to act as framework nation for a European operation.

General Thonier: Picking up on Ms Arnould’s comment regarding the exemplary behaviour of the Swedish contingent during the operation, General Thonier underlined the limitations of multinational involvement. Although possible for military staff, it was not advisable for the rank and file. General Thonier was however in favour of multinational capabilities. For ARTEMIS, therefore, national tactical units were deployed.

*******

At this point, General Bentégeat, former Chief of the Defence Staff and former Chairman of the European Union Military Committee, who had been directly involved in the events described, was invited to comment.

With regard to Operation ARTEMIS, he explained that he had negotiated the broad outlines of the operation with military staff and President Chirac, while steering well clear of diplomatic issues. He insisted on the importance of British and South African involvement given the proximity of the operation to neighbouring Rwanda and the militia linked with Rwanda. South Africa’s participation had been facilitated by the good relations between General Bentégeat and his South-African counterpart.

In terms of political responsibilities within the EU, while the operations commander and the commander of the armed forces (two different positions) were able to assume a certain number of political responsibilities if operational constraints so required, the political consequences of military decisions were such that, at a certain level, political decisions were also required. General Bentégeat recounted an instance where nobody in the EU governing institutions was in a position to make a political decision on an operational issue, a problem that is still unresolved to this day.

Ms Arnould agreed that this was, indeed, still an unresolved issue. In her opinion, this sort of decision should be made by the President of the European Council with the support of a high-level military adviser.

*******

Q&A session:

- While the success of ARTEMIS is universally applauded, the exercise has never been repeated. Why not?

For Ms Arnould, new concepts, such as ‘battlegroups’ had complicated the decision-making process by making it less flexible. In addition, on a further occasion when EU intervention was suggested, President Sarkozy preferred to opt France out. Since 2008, France has had no further desire to be a framework nation.

General Thonier was fully in agreement with Ms Arnould. A new ARTEMIS operation would only be possible if one of the Member States was prepared to take on the responsibility of acting as framework nation and if public opinion in the country concerned was prepared to accept the possibility of loss of human life. To conduct emergency operations involving use of force, there was no alternative to the Framework Nation Concept.

- Within the EU, why are there no official meetings of the Defence Ministers of Member States other than European Defence Agency meetings?

For Claude-France Arnould, the responsibility for this lay with the diplomats and their “duplicitous and damaging” behaviour. She was campaigning for a Council of Defence Ministers, especially as the EU now possessed common defence instruments. Whether for operations or capacities, creating a Council of Defence Ministers should be seen as a necessity. However, many national governments still wanted defence matters to remain part of Foreign Affairs.

- Given General Bentégeat’s level of responsibility, surely he (and those like him), qualified by definition as diplomats, or even politicians?

In reply, General Bentégeat considered that the word “diplomat” was ambiguous: to avoid upsetting the feelings of career Diplomats (with a capital D); a distinction had to be made between their profession and the fact of being diplomatic, i.e. acting “diplomatically”. That said, at his level of responsibility, it was vital to know how to deal with diplomats, politicians or their counterparts (on a parallel to negotiations through diplomatic channels).

Article translated into English by students at ISIT Paris, and proofread by Christine Cross (EuroDéfense-France Council member).