GEOPOLITICS OF THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE SECURITY OF EUROPE

By Jean-Paul Perruche (Lieutenant General, retired, former President of EuroDéfense-France) and Nathalie de Kaniv (Historian, EuroDéfense-France Delegate)

For more than thirty years, the situation in Balkans has been regularly giving cause for concern. This concern is fuelled by factors such as recent tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, Serbian support for Russia despite events in Ukraine, and the thorny issue of future European Union (EU) membership for countries in the region. Hardly surprising under such circumstances that the extent of defence and security issues in the Balkans should be so widely recognised.

With their crucial geostrategic position in south-eastern Europe, political, economic and security challenges in the western Balkans are legion. Several countries, such as Turkey, Russia, a number of Middle Eastern countries and China, already have vested interests in the region, which has serious implications for various EU policies, including those relating to defence.

Western Balkans: definition, history, and myths

As a result of the region’s particularly chequered history, the situation in the Balkans is extremely complex. The area has been invaded or annexed successively by the Greeks, the Persians, the Romans, the Slavs, the Byzantine Empire, the Mongols, the Ottomans and, finally, by the Austro-Hungarian Empire up until World War I, to say nothing of the religious conflicts besetting this part of the continent. The result is an extraordinary patchwork of cultures and identities. Separation of Balkan countries into small rival powers was reinforced by the 1878 Congress of Berlin, to the extent that the term “balkanisation” has come to apply to this type of fragmentation of states. From the end of the 19th century to the wars of the late 20th century, special treatment was reserved internationally for the Western Balkans, since they had not been annexed by Western countries. At the time, in a world dominated by the West, the Balkans remained a hotbed of rival influences and a playground for allcomers. This is still the case today, and the players are virtually the same: Russia, Turkey, Europe (struggling to present a united front), now joined by the US and China.

The neologism ‘Western Balkans’ was coined at the beginning of the 20th century but could it disappear in the future as the countries of the former Yugoslavia join the EU. Has Croatia effectively left the ‘Western Balkans’ by joining the EU? After the fragmentation of Cold-War Yugoslavia into secessionist states, the focus in the West was on a measure of disarmament, defusing offensive operational capabilities, and structural reforms to promote the rule of law. But the overall situation in the Balkans remains unstable, as evidenced by the recurring confrontations between Serbs and Bosnians in Bosnia, or between Kosovo and Serbia since the 1999 partition.

Why choose the European Union?

Decades after the break-up of Yugoslavia, the ensuing civil wars, the various peace-building initiatives of the international community and the creation of multi-ethnic, multi-faith states with, at times, artificially drawn internal and external borders, there remain many issues that could strongly influence the political stability of the region, and even that of Europe.

At the end of the 20th century, one of the many prevailing myths and illusions was the belief that the European community could present a united front. Admittedly, Europe stood united at the time of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But, in reality, it soon became apparent that the countries of the so-called ‘international community’ were each playing their own game. In addition, Turkey, which was “left out” of these peace agreements, wasted no time in raising its profile as a major player in the region with the enforcement of its policies in South-East Europe.

Another myth of the time was to think of China exclusively as a trading partner, only interested in doing business. For the past 10 years, however, China has emerged as a major and aggressive investor in the region, gradually gaining strength as a force to be reckoned with politically. China accounts for more than half the external debt of certain countries, giving it political leverage and influence in the region, e.g., over motorway construction in Montenegro.

In 2008, public opinion in some Balkan states strangely lurched with regard to Europe and a pro-EU consensus emerged. Even in Serbia, opponents of Europe suddenly became EU enthusiasts. Doubtless, the crisis in banking and financial circles at the time looked like putting paid to their prospects of EU membership, which probably contributed to this about-turn on the part of the pro-nationalists.

But this new and more cooperative relationship with the EU was negatively impacted by contradiction: the leaders of several countries, while proclaiming their desire to meet EU criteria, were at the same time becoming increasingly autocratic, a contention borne out by the inconsistencies between their words and their acts. Basically, they were mouthing the words the Europeans wanted to hear simply to benefit from potential advantages and gain credence on the political front. In addition, the ‘constructive ambiguity’ favoured by European diplomats often led to deadlock, the same issue being interpreted very differently from one country to another.

All this demonstrated the extent to which responsibility for the misinterpretation of European guidelines lies as much with the European authorities as with the Balkan countries, whence the state of their relations with the EU. An example of the consequences of the resulting more distant relations with the EU was a re-emergence of Greater Serbia irredentist ideology, and a reawakening of old nationalist demons and fears throughout the Western Balkans.

The democratic deficit has tended to worsen of late, firstly from disappointment in the face of the receding prospect of EU membership and, secondly, as a result of the growing presence of third, non-European states with their own agendas. There is therefore now the risk that certain countries may abandon democratic principles, the rule of law and European standards, even if it remains in their best interests to project a pro-European image of themselves.

The road to EU membership

The EU’s goal is to promote peace, stability and economic development in the Western Balkans and pave the way for their integration. In 1999, the EU launched the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which governs relations between the EU and countries in the region, and the Stability Pact, which is a broader initiative involving all major international players. In 2008, the Stability Pact was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council. In 2003, the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki confirmed that all SAP countries were potential candidates for EU membership. This prospect of European membership was then repeated in the Commission's February 2018 strategy on the Western Balkans and in the declarations issued after the various summits between the EU and Western Balkan countries.

Discussions took place among ministers on 15 November 2021 regarding practical ways of ‘strengthening’ the EU’s commitment ‘beyond enlargement’. As stated in the conclusions to this meeting, talks centred on how to ‘involve’ these countries more in EU foreign policy discussions and how to ‘improve’ cooperation in several areas, including cyber security, hybrid threats and the use of space data. ‘If these countries want to join the EU, it makes sense to see if they share our world view,’ Josep Borrell told the press.

In the Balkans there exists a spirit of compromise but the flame needs to be fanned. A coordinated European response remains important for the Western Balkans, where some states still represent a problem (Albania stands out as an island of stability and harmony in the region) and continue to stake national or territorial claims. Under such circumstances, European soft power can still serve a useful purpose, in particular by forcing reforms, not least via the new methodology for EU integration proposed by France and adopted in March 2021. This new method is not without its positive aspects, even if it needs further development. Before any conclusions may be drawn, however, it will be necessary to wait another two to three years. This methodology is, however, very demanding and therefore poorly received in the Balkans, where the feeling is that it will further dilute their prospects of full and rapid accession to the EU.

Relations with NATO and third countries

Under pressure from NATO, which became their dominant partner from the mid-1990s, Western Balkan countries were forced to redirect their military policies and together commit to becoming exporters rather than consumers of security. At the time, official security documents agreed on common positions with regard to security threats and residual tensions in the Balkans. However, a new dynamic has emerged in recent years.

Since 2015, Croatia and Serbia have been gradually and significantly modernising their armed forces, with declarations – mainly from Belgrade – leading to new tensions. Nevertheless, the press has shown restraint in reporting these new developments, describing them as measured and unlikely to challenge the balance of power. However, some concern still remains, since the importance apparently attached to the notion of balance of power begs the question of how much trust can exist in the current security context.

The Western Balkan states now belonging to NATO have embarked on somewhat modest investments, clearly relying on outside support for their security and subscribing to the dependency culture common among NATO countries. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the elites frequently voice their concern about the weapons recently procured by Croatia and Serbia. The Kosovan government has also expressed similar concerns, especially regarding Serbia’s increased military capabilities. In recent months, conflicts at the Kosovo-Serbia border and tensions between communities in Bosnia have substantially multiplied the number of references made by speakers to war and military capabilities. But, as things stand, it seems unlikely that Serbian rearmament will culminate in further warfare, not least in view of the recruitment problems encountered by the Serbian army.

It is particularly important to realise that military modernisation is one of the levers used by politicians to win over local voters. Moreover, developing a defence industry can have socio-economic advantages, including for the elites, who may see it as an opportunity for enrichment. In Serbia, reports on cooperation with non-Western states boast of technology transfers from China, financial investments from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the supply of major defence systems by Russia. In return, the Serbian authorities seek to win over public opinion by heaping praise on this foreign assistance. By contrast, Serbia’s more extensive and frequent cooperation with NATO countries has been far less well publicised, the same applying to ongoing arms deals with Saudi Arabia and Yemen and with UAE clients in Syria and Yemen, since these are not really consistent with Russian positions.

Current rearmament efforts remain limited in scope. The bigger challenge is the rhetoric used to exaggerate the importance of recent capability reinforcements and present the other countries in the region as rivals in an arms race. All of this is not conducive to trust and creates tensions.

But the risk of serious armed confrontation remains slight, as long as Western powers continue to have the last word, as they are the ones who actually ensure security in this region. Even Serbia does not want to cross any red lines, putting its economic development first. This does not stop President Vucic from fuelling vengeful, dissenting rhetoric in nationalist circles by presenting himself as the main guarantor of stability. The war in Ukraine will, however, probably dissuade him from taking things too far.

In view of their energy dependency and commercial interests, Balkan countries – especially Serbia – will be tempted to continue developing their relationships with China and Russia, while taking care not to cross the “red lines” drawn by NATO. The West’s strategy of explaining the consequences of being dependent on Russia and China should bear more fruit in the current context, although Balkan states could, in turn, take advantage of this situation to step up their economic or political demands.

In the defence sector, until such time as it receives better treatment from the West, Serbia will probably continue to multiply its partnerships across the globe. The CSDP, to which Serbia makes but a modest contribution, could also provide an opportunity to develop more sustainable and advantageous relationships with the political and industrial elites, but also with that part of the population that harbours resentments against the West.

The OSCE in South-East Europe

In the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the words “Western Balkans” are never used, the expression “South-East Europe” being preferred. It was the first organisation to open offices throughout the region, the first in Serbia and Kosovo.

Its role and its presence in South-East Europe are closely intertwined. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton Agreement defined the role of the OSCE mission which was considered to be an institution suitably qualified to secure peace and create stable, safe and democratic states. OSCE was originally responsible for the United Nation Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Pillar I (Police and Justice) under UNSC Resolution 1244 in 1999 and Decision 305 of the OSCE Permanent Council of July 1999. It also intervened on mandate in North Macedonia following the 2001 crisis to ensure the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement.

The OSCE plays a major role in two key areas in South-East Europe

Firstly, in preparing and monitoring electoral processes via the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Its competencies in this field are widely recognised and vital for democracy in the region. Long and short-term election observation missions by participating States and acting on behalf of the OSCE administration guarantee objectivity, providing situation analyses and specific recommendations for local authorities.

Secondly, with regard to freedom of the media, where the OSCE intervenes through the RFOM (Representative on Freedom of the Media). It also guarantees protection for minorities, through the High Commissioner on National Minorities (Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Kosovo).

Overall, the OSCE is achieving positive results in South-East Europe. In addition to the work of the ODIHR and the RFOM, the creation of the Transnational Threats Department (TNT) within the OSCE Secretariat addresses the needs of host countries to combat arms and drug trafficking and organised crime. Moreover, by adapting the mandates of the individual field missions in agreement with the countries concerned, OSCE efficiency has been further enhanced. The OSCE’s skills in promoting gender equality and combating domestic violence are also highly appreciated by donors and international organisations. In South-East Europe, the OSCE cooperates and coordinates closely with other key organisations. The EU remains its main contributor in various sectors: media, democratisation, elections, justice, training, border controls, and return of refugees or displaced persons.

French strategy for the Western Balkans

Little involved in the region for a number of years, France has now reactivated its foreign policy vis-à-vis these countries. French strategy in the Western Balkans comes in four parts: political, economic and financial, security and defence, soft diplomacy.

Politically, visits by the President to Belgrade in 2019, and to Croatia more recently, are proof of French engagement at the very highest level. The President met with all his counterparts and made his attachment to the region very clear. The aim of these visits was to re-establish a proper balance in relations with all the Western Balkan countries, although particular attention is reserved for Serbia, the most densely populated among them.

Again politically, two main issues stand out, both of which have been discussed at Franco-German summits:

● Normalising relations between Serbia and Kosovo to lessen the negative effects on the region of their hostile relationship and address European security issues;

● Ending to the deadlock in negotiations with North Macedonia.

From a financial standpoint, the French Development Agency, whose tasks extend over the entire region, has opened a regional agency in Belgrade which employs some dozen people. Its actions have culminated in investment agreements signed by all the countries – except Bosnia – and a portfolio target of €500 million for 2022. Priority is being given to transformation of the economy, the green agenda, energy, etc. These considerable and diversified financial efforts are first being directed towards Serbia, with large-scale projects such as Belgrade airport and the city’s underground.

Regarding security and defence, several countries in the region contribute to overseas field operations in Africa and are ready to increase their contributions. For security, the focus is on efforts to combat the proliferation of small and medium-calibre weapons, and on cybersecurity.

And lastly, soft diplomacy consists of engaging with civil society and the younger generation, supporting reforms, developing a network of experts and promoting the French language. To be efficient and make up for lost time, it is vital for the entire state apparatus to engage with this region.

In conclusion:

European attitudes towards the Western Balkans have greatly altered in recent years. Within the institutions, things began to change in 2018 with a reassessment of the EU’s interests in the region. A new dynamic based on mutual interest has brought a new kind of relationship. This is underpinned by an understanding that European security is linked to that of the region, that the EU will benefit directly from prosperity in these countries, and that progress there has a major economic and environmental dimension.

For countries in the Western Balkans, acquisition of EU membership will represent the culmination of a historical, geographical, and political process. The form of cooperation now adopted with these countries is therefore fundamental. It is important that the benefits of cooperation should be felt positively by all concerned, as members of the same European family. And the support of the people in these countries will be vital in achieving the common goals of stability, prosperity, and security.

Jean-Paul Perruche (Lieutenant General, retired, former President of EuroDéfense-France) and Nathalie de Kaniv (Historian, EuroDéfense-France Delegate)

Article translated into English by students at ISIT Paris, and proofread by Christine Cross (EuroDéfense-France Council member).